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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN M. BARNEY & SONS, INC., : 
and the STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. Case No. 16020 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
and ROBERT LAMAR JENSEN, 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Robert LaMar Jensen filed a claim for compensation 
with the Industrial Commission of Utah on January 26, 1977, 
wherein he alleged he was injured by accident in the course 
and scope of his employment on October 20, 1976. In this 
application he alleged that at the time of his injury he was an 
employee, for compensation purposes, of both Chris Patton, 
doing business as Western Express, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Patton") and Glen M. Barney & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter referred 
to as "Barney"). Barney denied the existence of any employment 
relationship with the applicant at the time of his injury. 
DIPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Following a formal hearing before Administrative Law 
Judge Keith E. Sohm on May 12, 1977, an Order was entered finding 
joint liability on the part of Patton and Barney. The State 
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Insurance Fund, as compensation carrier for Barney, filed a 
timely Motion for Review of this Order with the Industrial 
Commission, which Motion was denied by a divided vote of the 
commissioners, with the only law trained member of the Commis-
sion dissenting on the issue of Barney's liability. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant respectfully request that the Order of the 
commission regarding the liability of Barney be affirmed. 
Defendant agrees with plaintiff's Statement of Facts 
but supplements the same with the following: 
There were 22 trucks and 40 to 44 drivers of Patton. 
(R. 52) Duane Branch was the immediate supervisor and only 
employee of Patton present other than drivers. Glen Barney 
or one of his employees at the loading site did the dispatching. 
I 
I 
(R. 52) Bill of ladings were signed "Barney" and the truck number.! 
(R.53) The bill of ladings listed "Glen M. Barney and Sons" 
as the carrier. (R.53) The signed tickets were returned to 
Barney at the weigh station. (R.53) Logs were made out in the 
name of "Western Express" but later were changed to list "Barney" 
as the carrier. All logs were turned into "Barney". It was under 
the direction of either the person running the loader or else 
Craig Barney that you received instruction and direction as to 
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when you loaded, and how and at what end of the pile. (R.56) 
Lining up to load was under the direction of Barney. (R.57) 
There is only one route to Page, Arizona and return. (R.76) 
A copy of the contract between Barney and Patton was in the truck 
at all times. (R.80) Jensen was instructed or understood that 
"whenever you're leased to a company, the person you are leased 
to is the boss and they do have control over the vehicle as 
long as it's leased to them." (R.99) Jensen understood that Mr. 
Barney had the vehicle under lease, and he was to take orders 
from him if he gave them. (R.99) Western Express, Inc. filed 
for bankruptcy on April 17, 1978. (R.l49) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF A STATUTORY 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND 
PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-42 
(2) U.C.A.,l953, AS AMENDED. 
Defendant concedes that plaintiff was not the common 
law employee of Barney. Defendant also will concede that under 
the provisions of Section 35-1-42 (2) U.C.A.,l953, in defining 
the ordinary and usual employment relationship,ie. "(2) Every .•. 
private corporation ••.. having in service one or more workmen ... 
under any contract of hire ...• oral or written," is an employer 
within the meaning of the Act, does not make defendant an employee. 
-3-
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Defendant contends that here the plaintiff was a 
statutory employer within the meaning of the last paragraph 
of the above statute. Section 35-1-42(2) U.C.A.,l953 provides 
in the final paragraph: 
"Where any employer procures any work to be 
~wholly or in part by a contractor over whose work 
he retains supervision or control, and such work 
is a part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer, such contractor, and all persons employed 
by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all 
persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall 
be deemed, within the meaning of this section, em-
ployees of such original employer. Any person, firm 
or corporation engaged in the performance of work as 
an independent contractor shall be deemed an employer 
within the meaning of this section. The term "indepen-
dent contractor", as herein used is defined to be any 
person, association or corporation engaged in the 
performance of any work for another, who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject 
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job or piece 
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only 
in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design." (Emphasis added) 
There is no question but what Barney is the "employer" 
who procured the work (transporting coal) to be done by a 
"contractor" (Patton) and that such work was a part or process 
of the trade or business of Barney. Barney was hauling coal 
under contract from Salina to Page, Arizona. There is also no 
dispute that the defendant was the employee of Patton. There-
fore, if there be sufficient evidence to show that Barney had 
retained "supervision or control" over either Patton or defendant, 
-4-
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the defendant becomes the "employee of such original employer" 
(Barney) and is entitled to benefits from the plaintiff. 
A review of the record shows the following: 
Western Express had 40 to 44 truck drivers and 20 
to 22 trucks with one supervisor on the job who was the only 
non-driver present. (R.S2) Defendant testified on direct examina-
tion: 
"q. What was your understanding of the position of 
Duane Branch? 
a. He would be the immediate supervisor or the manager. 
q. Was there a dispatcher, or anyone else, that told 
the trucks when to go and come? 
a. No. It would be just at the loading site. It 
would either be Glen Barney or ... (Further statement 
unaudible to the reporter)" (R.52) 
And later defendant testified: 
"q. During the loading process, where did you load 
actually? 
a. At the railhead for Southern Utah Fuel, in Salina, 
Utah. 
q. Who told you how to get in and get out, and move 
around the loading area? 
a. It was either the person running the loader, or 
else craig Barney was over there quite often directing 
it. So it would be under Southern Utah Fuel and 
Barney's direction as to when you loaded, and how and 
at what end of the pile. 
q. was Mr. Branch ever over there? 
-5-
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a. Not very often 
q. Now were there any specific instructions about 
the way in which you lined up? 
a. Mainly to not, you know, get ahead of one of the 
other trucks. Such as going in line and loading in 
your turn." (R. 56, 57) 
And finally defendant testified under re-cross 
examination -
"q. Mr. Jensen, you indicated earlier, when you 
were asked about your employer, you said: "I knew 
my direct employer was the owner of the truck." 
You knew, of course, that the truck was leased to 
Barney? 
a. Yes, sir. 
q. And were you under the impression--or instructed--
that, since the vehicle was leased to Mr. Barney, 
that you were to take instructions from him as to 
using it, if he might give some. 
a. Yes, sir. That is standard procedure. Whenever 
you are leased to a company, the person you're leased 
to is the boss. They do have control over the vehicle 
as long as it is leased to them. 
q. And you understood then, when you went to work--
! gather from Mr. Patton--that Mr. Barney had the 
vehicle under lease, and that you were to take orders 
from him if he gave them? 
a. Yes, sir. That's standard knowledge on that. 
q. You were also to take orders from Mr. Patton, 
and his supervisor there at the scene if they were 
given? Is that right? 
a. Yes, sir. Or if Mr. Barney changed them, then 
we'd follow his directions too." (R.98,99) 
-6-
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It must be noted here that Mr. Glen Barney was 
present throughout the entire hearing, testified as to the identi-
fication of certain documents (R.l05) but did not testify in 
contradiction to any of the testimony of the defendant. It is 
fair then to assume that the testimony of the defendant is not 
only uncontroverted but represents in fact both certain actions 
of direct control and implied control or the right to control 
details of the contractors work or that of his employees. 
Defendant agrees that the form lease offered as an 
exhibit to establish the relationship between Barney and Patton 
was viable and important evidence. The lease also spelled out 
certain restrictions and limitations of liability to the parties. 
The contract also attempted to eliminate any possibility of the 
"CARRIER" being the employer of either the "OWNER" or the 
employees of the "OWNER". 
In the case of Harry L. Young and Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 
538 P2d 316(1975), the same type of agreement was signed by 
Ashton (the owner-lessee) that Young was not the employer and 
Ashton fully understood that Young did not employ any drivers. 
rn that case the court did not have any di=ficulty in sustaining 
the Commission's finding that Young was still the employer of 
Ashton. In the Young case the commission was more concerned 
about the "exercise of control" or the "right to exercise 
-7-
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control". 
1286, 
This court has said in Barnbrough v. Bethers, 552 P2d 
"In determining who is the employer of an 
employee, the right to control the employee's work 
is dispositive of the question; the degree of control 
actually exercised need not be great, so long as the 
right exists." 
This court has ruled in a number of cases concerning 
third party liability under Section 35-1-62 u.c.A.,l953 that 
most employees of sub-contractors are considered to be "in the 
same employment" as the general contractor. (Emphasis added) 
Adamson v. Okland construction Co., 29 U. 2d 286, 508 P2d 805 
held that an employee of an electrical subcontractor could not 
sue the general contractor in tort liability because they 
were "in the same emplovment". (Emphasis added) 
Where the general contractors right to 
supervision or control over sub-contractor by 
supervising the over-all continuity and integration 
of work among various subcontractors, directing the 
sequence of the work by the subcontractors, making 
changes in the work done by them and ordering work 
stoppages" were considered sufficient. 
Section 35-1-62 U.C.A.,l953, provides in part: 
"When any injury or death for which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another person 
not in the same employment, the injured employee or 
in the case of death his dependents, may claim compen-
sation and the injured employee or his heirs or personai1 
representative may also have an action for damages 
against such third person----". (Emphasis added) 
-8-
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In construing the critical phrase - "in the 
same employment" -this court in Smith v. Alfred Brown co., 
27 U. 2d 155, 493 P2d 994 had no difficulty in determining that 
masonry work was a part or process of the trade or business of 
a general contractor and that the general contractor exercised 
sufficient control to place the employees of the masonry sub-
contractor "in the same employment" as the general contractor. 
In Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U 2d 139, 442 P2d 31, 
this court spelled out the elements of control by the general 
contractor - Gibbons and Reed. 
"Defendant was told when to speed his trips 
and when to back up to the traxcavator and when to 
drive away, and he could not haul dirt in any other 
manner than as he was told. 
If the driver of the truck failed to maintain his 
position in line, the foreman of Gibbons and Reed 
could stop the truck from hauling." 
On these and certain other statements the court con-
eluded that an employer-employee relationship existed between 
Gallegos and Gibbons and Reed - sufficient to deny an action 
based upon negligence by a third party sub-contractor. 
In Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 113 U 504, 
196 P2d 718, the court affirmed that the crucial factor in 
determining whether or not an applicant for workmens compensation 
is an "employee" or an "independent contractor" is whether the 
-9-
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person for whom services were performed had the right to control 
the execution of the work. This was confirmed in the case of 
Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113 U 451, 196 P2d 502, 
refining the former by saying the "extent of control is the 
important test" in distinguishing between "employee" and "indepen~ 
dent contractor". 
In the earlier case of Parkinson v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 110 U. 309, 172 P2d 136, the court held that the "existence 
of a potential right to control is suf·ficient to create the 
relationship even though the right is never exercised." 
Applying this concept of either "control in fact" or 
the "potential right to control" to the instant case, one is led 
to the conclusion that both elements were in fact present. 
The court is directed to the uncontradicted testimony 
of the defendant that there was only one foreman or supervisor 
from Patton present for the 40 to 44 drivers, that directions 
were frequently if not mostly given by Barney or his employees, 
that directions to line up and depart were given by Barney, 
that Jensen understood Patton was his immediate employer but 
that he was to take orders from Barney when or if they were given 
and that all bills of lading, trip permits and paper work was 
in the name of Barney. 
The conclusion appears inescapable that there was 
present under the working conditions at that time sufficient 
-10-
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exercise of control by Barney of the details of Patton's work 
and sufficient control or right to control the actual work 
of employees of Patton to make the defendant in this case 
either an "employee in fact" or a "statutory employee" and thus 
entitling the defendant to benefits from these plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's finding of statutory employment 
based upon Section 35-1-42(2) is amply supported by the record. 
Defendant has met the burden of establishing the presence, 
exercise and right to exercise control over both the activities 
of this defendant and his emP.loyer as well. 
Dated this ~~y of April, 1979. 
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